The widespread adoption of deep learning models places demands on their robustness. In this paper, we consider the robustness of deep neural networks on videos, which comprise both the spatial features of individual frames extracted by a convolutional neural network and the temporal dynamics between adjacent frames captured by a recurrent neural network. To measure robustness, we study the maximum safe radius problem, which computes the minimum distance from the optical flow set obtained from a given input to that of an adversarial example in the norm ball. We demonstrate that, under the assumption of Lipschitz continuity, the problem can be approximated using finite optimisation via discretising the optical flow space, and the approximation has provable guarantees. We then show that the finite optimisation problem can be solved by utilising a two-player turn-based game in a cooperative setting, where the first player selects the optical flows and the second player determines the dimensions to be manipulated in the chosen flow. We employ an anytime approach to solve the game, in the sense of approximating the value of the game by monotonically improving its upper and lower bounds. We exploit a gradient-based search algorithm to compute the upper bounds, and the admissible A* algorithm to update the lower bounds. Finally, we evaluate our framework on the UCF101 video dataset.
frames, which can be extracted by CNNs, as well as the temporal dynamics between neighbouring frames, which can be captured by RNNs. Our main contributions are as follows.
• We define the maximum safe radius problem for DNNs for sequential video inputs by working directly with the optical flow sets, and, using Lipschitz continuity, discretise the optimisation problem for computing the maximal such radius into a finite optimisation that approximates it.
• We solve the finite optimisation problem via a two-player turn-based game, where Player I selects among optical flows and Player II determines manipulations imposed within the chosen flows, and demonstrate that the solution is Player I's reward when taking the optimal strategy.
• To approximate the reward of the game, we design an anytime approach, in the sense of exploiting a gradient-based algorithm to compute the upper bounds and the admissible A* algorithm to improve the lower bounds.
• We evaluate the proposed framework on the UCF101 video dataset, and present converging upper and lower bounds of the maximum safe radius.
Related work The notion of robustness for neural networks has been mainly studied in the context of image classification, but, to the best of our knowledge, there is no work addressing robustness guarantees for videos. We review only works that are most relevant to our approach. Apart from [19, 18, 17] , Szegedy et al. [27] implement a targeted search for adversarial examples for image classification via minimising the Euclidean distance between the images while keeping missclassification. A subsequent improvement, the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [6] , computes a linearised version of the cost function to obtain the gradients for manipulation directions. Carlini & Wagner [3] transform the existence of adversarial examples into an optimisation problem so that optimisation algorithms can be applied. Automated verification methods [7, 22, 23] aim to compute robustness guarantees against adversarial attacks; we mention constraint solving [21] , e.g., Reluplex [14] , or exhaustive exploration of a discretised neighbourhood of a point [12] . In [31] a game-based verification approach is proposed for computing the maximal safe radius for feed-forward networks, including CNNs; our method draws on that approach but we are able to handle video inputs.
Adversarial attacks have also been developed for recurrent neural networks on time-series inputs. For instance, Papernot et al. [20] extend previous algorithms [19, 6] to craft adversarial input sequences for RNNs by using computational graph unfolding to compute the forward derivative of the recurrence cycle. Moreover, both [13] and [30] develop adversarial attacks on the UCF101 dataset; while the former utilises a two-stream classifier, the latter chooses a CNN + RNN architecture. Apart from these attack methods, more recent efforts have attempted to to verify the robustness of RNNs, though not on videos. [15] define a series of RNN abstractions in the form of feed-forward networks, prove their equivalence to the original ones, and subsequently perform reachability analysis via Linear Programming (LP) and Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT) [1] . Alternatively, [28] extract deterministic finite automata (DFA) from certain RNNs as the oracle, and use them to evaluate adversarial accuracy.
Preliminaries
Deep neural networks Let N be a neural network with a set of classes C. Given an input v and a class c ∈ C, we use N (v, c) to denote the confidence of N believing that v is in class c. We work with the Softmax logit value of the last layer, but the methods can be adapted to the probability value after normalisation. Thus, N (v) = arg max c∈C N (v, c) is the class into which N classifies v. Moreover, as N in this work can have convolutional and recurrent layers, we let N C denote the convolutional part and N R the recurrent part. Specifically, since the inputs we consider are videos, we let the input domain D be R l×w×h×ch , where l is the length of v, i.e., the number of frames, and w, h, ch are the width, height, and channels of each frame, respectively.
Optical flow In order to capture the dynamic characteristics of the moving objects in a video, we utilise optical flow [2, 29] , which is a pattern of the apparent motion of the image objects between two consecutive frames caused by the movement of the objects or the camera. There exist methods in the computer vision community to compute optical flows, for instance, the Lucas-Kanade method [16] and the Gunnar Farnebäck algorithm [4] . Definition 1 (Optical Flow Equation) . Consider a pixel P(x, y, t) in a frame, where x, y denote the horizontal and vertical positions respectively, and t denotes the time dimension. If after dt time, the pixel moves by distance (dx , dy) in the next frame, then P(x, y, t) = P(x + dx , y + dy , t + dt) holds. After taking Taylor series approximation, removing common terms, and dividing by dt, the
where f x , f y are the image gradients, f t is the gradient along time, and the motion (u, v) is unknown.
Distance metrics and Lipschitz continuity In robustness evaluation, L k distance metrics are typically used to measure the discrepancy between inputs, denoted as α − α L k , where k ∈ {1, 2, ∞} indicates Manhattan (L 1 ), Euclidean (L 2 ), and Chebyshev (L ∞ ) distances. Since our inputs are videos, i.e., sequences of frames, we will need a suitable metric. In this paper, we will work directly with L k distance metrics on optical flows, as described in the next section. Moreover, we consider neural networks that satisfy Lipschitz continuity, and note that all networks with bounded inputs are Lipschitz continuous, such as the common fully-connected, convolutional, ReLU, and softmax layers. We denote by Lip c the Lipschitz constant for class c.
3 Robustness: formulation and approximation Robustness and maximum safe radius In this work, we focus on pointwise robustness, which is defined as the invariance of a network's classification over a small neighbourhood of a given input. Following this, the robustness of a classification decision for a specific input can be understood as the non-existence of adversarial examples in the neighbourhood of the input. Here, we work with the norm ball as a neighbourhood of an input, that is, given an input v, a distance metric L k , and
is the set of inputs whose distance to v is no greater than d based on the L k -norm. Intuitively, the norm ball B with centre v and radius d limits perturbations to at most d w.r.t. L k . Then (pointwise) robustness is defined as follows.
If this holds, we say N is safe with respect to v within d based on the L k -norm.
While the above definition returns only True or False, we take a step further to quantify the measurement of robustness. That is, we compute the distance to the original input in the sense that, if exceeding the distance, there definitely exists an adversarial example, whereas, within the distance, all the points are safe. We formally define this distance as the maximum safe radius as follows. Definition 3 (Maximum Safe Radius). Given a network N , an input v, a distance metric L k , and a distance d, the maximum safe radius (MSR) problem is to compute the minimum distance from the original input v to an adversarial example v , i.e.,
Maximum safe radius with respect to optical flow In existing works that evaluate a network's robustness over images, it is common to manipulate each image at pixel-or channel-level, and then compute the distance between the perturbed and original inputs. However, as we deal with time-series inputs, i.e., videos, instead of manipulating directly on each individual frame, we impose perturbation on each optical flow that is extracted from every pair of adjacent frames, so that both spatial features on frames and temporal dynamics between frames can be captured. We define optical flow as follows. Definition 4 (Optical Flow). Given an input v with length l of frames F, the optical flow extraction function f : v → P(v) maps an input v to a set of optical flows P(v), where for each optical flow p t ∈ P(v) we have f :
Then, to study the crafting of adversarial examples, we construct manipulations on the optical flow to obtain perturbed inputs. Note that if the input values are bounded, e.g., [0, 255] or [0, 1], then the perturbed inputs need to be restricted to be within the bounds. Definition 5 ((Atomic) Optical Flow Manipulation). Given an input v with a set of optical flow P(v), an instruction function Θ : R → N, and a manipulation magnitude τ , we define the input manipulation operations
where w, h denote the width and height of v. Specifically, when Θ : R → {+1, −1}, we say the manipulation is atomic, denoted as M θ,τ .
Moreover, after remapping the manipulated flow back to the original frame, we obtain a perturbed new frame, i.e., f :
, and the manipulated flow set, f : v, M Θ,τ (P(v)) → v , maps to a new video with the perturbation. To this end, we compute the distance from M Θ,τ (P(v)) to P(v) instead of that from v to v because the former reflects both spatial and temporal manipulations simultaneously. That is, we compute the maximum safe radius
Approximation based on Lipschitz continuity Here, we utilise the fact that the networks studied in this work are Lipschitz continuous to discretise the neighbourhood space of an optical flow set, i.e., transform the infinite number of points in the norm ball into a finite number on the grid. First, based on the definitions of optical flow and input manipulation, we transform the MSR problem into the following finite maximum safe radius problem. Definition 6 (Finite Maximum Safe Radius). Given an input v, and a manipulation function
) denote the perturbed input, then the finite maximum safe radius with respect to optical flow is
Intuitively, we aim to find a set of manipulations θ ∈ Θ to impose on a set of optical flows p t ∈ P(v), such that the distance between the flow sets is minimal, and after the remapping procedure the perturbed input v is an adversarial example. Considering that, within a norm ball
, the set of manipulations is finite for a fixed magnitude τ , the FMSR problem only needs to explore a finite number of the 'grid' points. To achieve this, we let g be a τ -grid point such that |g − P(v)| = n × τ , and
) be the set of τ -grid points whose corresponding optical flow sets are in B.
Note that all the τ -grid points are reachable from each other via manipulation. By selecting a proper τ , we ensure that the optical flow space can be covered by small sub-spaces. That is,
, and τ for L ∞ . Now, we can use FMSR to estimate MSR within the error bounds, as in Figure 1 . Theorem 1 (Error Bounds). Given a manipulation magnitude τ , the optical flow space can be discretised into a set of τ -grid points, and MSR can be approximated as Then, the problem is to determine τ . Note that, in order to make sure each τ -grid point g covers all the possible manipulation points in its neighbourhood, we compute the largest τ . We now show that τ can be obtained via Lipschitz continuity. For a network N which is Lipschitz continuous at input v, given Lipschitz constant Lip c , c ∈ C, for each class, we havẽ
The detailed proof is attached in Appendix A.1. Here we remark that, whiled (L k , τ ) is with respect to input v andd(L k , τ ) is with respect to the flow set P(v), the relation between them, and similarly that between f and f , is dependent on the optical flow extraction method used. As this is not the main focus of this work, we do not expand on this topic.
A game-based robustness verification approach
In this section, we demonstrate that the finite optimisation problem FMSR of Definition 6 can be reduced to the computation of a player's reward when taking an optimal strategy in a game-based setting. To this end, we adapt the game-based approach proposed in [31] for robustness evaluation of CNNs on images.
Problem solving as a two-player turn-based game We define a two-player turn-based game, in which Player I chooses which optical flow to perturb, and Player II then imposes atomic manipulations of the dimensions within the selected flow. Definition 7 (Game). Given an input v and its optical flow set
• S ∪ (S × P(v)) denotes the set of game states, in which S is the set of Player I's states whereas S × P(v) is the set of Player II's states. Each s ∈ S corresponds to an optical flow set P(s) in the norm ball B(P(v), L k , d).
• s 0 ∈ S is the initial state such that P(s 0 ) corresponds to the original optical flow set P(v).
• T I : S × P(v) → S × P(v) is Player I's transition relation defined as T I (s, p t ) = (s, p t ), and
→ C is the labelling function that assigns each game state's corresponding input to a class N (f (v, P(s))).
To compute FMSR of Definition 6, we let the game G be cooperative. When it proceeds, two players take turns -Player I employs a strategy σ I to select optical flow, then Player II employs a strategy σ II to determine atomic manipulations -thus forming a path ρ, which is a sequence s 0 σ I s 1 σ II s 2 · · · . Formally, we define the strategy of the game as follows. Let P ath F I be a set of finite paths ending in Player I's state, and P ath F II be a set of finite paths ending in Player II's state, we define a strategy profile σ = (σ I , σ II ), such that σ I : P ath
of Player I maps a finite path to a distribution over next actions, and similarly σ II : P ath
Intuitively, by imposing atomic manipulations in each round, the game searches for potential adversarial examples with increasing distance to the original optical flow. Given ρ, let v ρ = f (v, last(ρ)) denote the input corresponding to the last state of ρ, and P(v ρ ) denote its optical flow set, we write the termination condition tc(ρ)
, which means that the game is in a state whose corresponding input is either classified differently, or the associated optical flow set is outside the norm ball. In order to quantify the distance accumulated along a path, we define a reward function as follows. Intuitively, the reward is the distance to the original optical flow if an adversarial example is found, and otherwise it is the weighted summation of the rewards of its children on the game tree. Definition 8 (Reward). Give a strategy profile σ = (σ I , σ II ), and a finite path ρ, we define a reward function
, if ¬tc(ρ) and ρ ∈ P ath
where σ I (ρ)(p t ) is the probability of Player I choosing optical flow p t along ρ, and σ II (ρ)(θ) is the probability of Player II choosing atomic manipulation M θ,τ along ρ. Also, ρT I (last(ρ), p t ) and ρT II (last(ρ), θ) are the resulting paths of Player I, Player II applying σ I , σ II , respectively. Essentially, it is adding to ρ a new state after transition.
Robustness guarantees
We now confirm that the game can return the optical value of the reward function as the solution to the FMSR problem. Proof of the following theorem is in Appendix A.2. Theorem 2 (Guarantees). Given an input v, a game model G(N , v, L k , d), and an optimal strategy profile σ = (σ I , σ II ), the finite maximum safe radius problem is to minimise the reward of initial state s 0 based on σ, i.e., FMSR(N , P(v), L k , d, τ ) = min R(σ, s 0 ).
Computation of the converging upper and lower bounds
Upper bound: gradient-based search We utilise a gradient-based search algorithm to compute an upper bound of FMSR. Here, we utilise the spatial features extracted from individual frames. Definition 9 (Spatial Features). Given a network N , let N C denote the convolutional part, then N C : v → η ∈ R l×m maps from input v to its extracted spatial features η, which has consistent length l of v and feature dimension m of a frame. Then, we pass η into the recurrent part N R and obtain the classification results, i.e., N R : η → N (v, c), c ∈ C.
The objective is to manipulate optical flow as imperceptibly as possible while altering the final classification. We write the objective function as follows:
where is a constant, and ∇ pt (N , v) is the perturbation imposed on p t . The key point is to minimise ∇ pt (N , v) so that the perturbation is unnoticeable while simultaneously changing N (v). Here, we utilise the loss of N on v, denoted as l On one hand, ∂η/∂p t essentially exhibits the relation between spatial features and optical flow. Here we reuse input manipulation (Definition 5) to compute ∂η/∂p t , though instead of manipulating the flow we impose perturbation directly on the frame. Intuitively, we manipulate the pixels of each frame to see how the subtle optical flow between the original and the manipulated frames will influence the spatial features. Each time we manipulate a single pixel of a frame, we get a new frame which is slightly different. If we perform M Θ,τ on pixel F[m, n], and denote the manipulated frame as F m,n , its spatial features as η m,n , the subtle optical flow between F m,n and F as δp m,n , then ∂η/∂p t can be computed as in Equation (8). On the other hand, ∂l N v /∂η shows how the spatial features will influence the classification, which can be reflected by the loss of the network. After getting η from N C , we can obtain l , then for this frame we have the gradient in Equation (9) .
Remark. From the definition of spatial features, i.e., η = N C (v), we know that the spatial features η only depend on each individual F of v and do not capture the temporal information between frames. That is, when N C remains unchanged, η and F have a direct relation, which indicates that the gradient of the latter can reflect that of the former. Therefore, during implementation, instead of the distance between η m,n and η, we calculate that between F m,n and F, i.e., F m,n − F L k .
Algorithm 1: Admissible A* for DNN Verification Lower bound: admissible A* We exploit admissible A* to compute the lower bound of Player I's reward, i.e., FMSR. An A* algorithm gradually unfolds the game model into a tree, in the sense that it maintains a set of children nodes of the expanded partial tree, and computes an estimate for each node. The key point is that in each iteration it selects the node with the least estimated value to expand. The estimation comprises two components: (1) the exact reward up to the current node, and (2) the estimated reward to reach the goal node. To guarantee the lower bound, we need to make sure that the estimated reward is minimal. For this part, we let the A* algorithm be admissible, which means that, given a current node, it never overestimates the reward to the terminal goal state. For each state s in the game model G, we assign an estimated distance value DistanceEstimation(s) = P(s) − P(s 0 ) L k + heuristic(P(s)), where P(s) − P(s 0 ) L k is the distance from the original state s 0 to the current state s based on the L k -norm, and heuristic(P(s)) is the admissible heuristic function that estimates the distance from the current state s to the terminal state. Here, we usẽ d(L k , τ ) in Equation (4). We present the admissible A* algorithm in Algorithm 1.
Experimental results
This section presents the evaluation results of our framework to approximate the maximum safe radius w.r.t optical flow on a video dataset. We perform the experiments on a Linux server with NVIDIA GeForce GTX Titan Black GPUs, and the operating system is Ubuntu 14.04.3 LTS. The results are obtained from a VGG16 [24] + LSTM [11] network on the UCF101 [25] video dataset. Details about the dataset, the network structure, and training/testing parameters can be found in Appendix A.3.
Adversarial examples via manipulating optical flows We illustrate how optical flow can capture the temporal dynamics of the moving objects in neighbouring frames. In this case, we exploit the Gunnar Farnebäck algorithm [4] as it computes the optical flow for all the pixels in a frame, i.e., dense optical flow, instead of a sparse feature set. Figure 2 presents an optical flow generated from two adjacent frames of a video labelled as SoccerJuggling: (a) shows two frames sampled at 0 s and 1 s of the video; and (b) exhibits the characteristics of the flow: magnitude and direction. We observe that, while the indoor background essentially remains unchanged, the motion of the player together with the football is clearly captured by the flow. See more examples in Appendix A. 4 . We now demonstrate how a very slight perturbation on the flow, almost imperceptible to human eyes, can lead to a misclassification of the whole video. Figure 3 exhibits that a video originally classified as LongJump with confidence 100.00% is manipulated into FloorGymnastics with confidence 86.10%. Two sampled frames at 1 s and 2 s are shown in the top row. If we compare the original optical flow of magnitude and direction (2nd row) generated from the frames with the perturbed ones (bottom row), we can hardly notice the difference (3rd row). However, the classification of the video has changed.
Converging upper and lower bounds
We illustrate the convergence of the bound computation for the maximum safe radius with respect to manipulations on the optical flows extracted from the consecutive frames of a video. Take a FloorGymnastics video as an example. Figure 4 exhibits five sampled frames (top row) and the optical flows extracted between them (2nd row). By utilising our framework, we present the approximation of MSR in Figure 5 , where the red line indicates the descending trend of the upper bound, whereas the blue line denotes the ascending trend of the lower bound. Intuitively, after 20 iterations of the gradient-based algorithm, the upper bound, i.e., minimum distance to an adversarial example, is 2100.45 based on the L 2 distance metric. That is, any manipulation imposed on the flows exceeding this upper bound is definitely unsafe. Figure 4 (3rd row) shows some of such unsafe perturbations on each optical flow, which result in the misclassification of the video into FrontCrawl with confidence 97.04%. As for the lower bound, we observe that, after 1500 iterations of the admissible A* algorithm, the lower bound reaches 146.61. That is, manipulations within this L 2 -norm ball is absolutely safe. Some of such safe perturbations can be found in the bottom row of Figure 4 . Due to space limit, we include another example in Appendix A.5.
Efficiency and scalability As for the computation time, the upper bound requires the gradient of optical flow with respect to the frame, and because we extract dense optical flow, the algorithm needs to traverse each pixel of a frame to impose atomic manipulations; thus it takes around 30 minutes to retrieve the gradient of each frame. Once the gradient of the whole video is obtained, and the framework enters into the cooperative game, i.e., the expansion of the tree, each iteration takes minutes. Meanwhile, for the lower bound, the admissible A* algorithm expands the game tree in each iteration which takes minutes, and updates the lower bound wherever applicable. Note that initially the lower bound may be updated in each iteration, but when the size of the game tree increases, it can take hours to update. Moreover, we analyse the scalability of our framework via an example of a HammerThrow video in Figure 6 , which shows the lower bounds obtained with respect to different dimensions of the manipulated optical flows. We observe that, within the same number of iterations, decreasing input dimension leads to faster convergence.
Conclusion
In this work, we study the maximum safe radius problem of neural networks, including CNNs and RNNs, with respect to the optical flow sets extracted from sequential videos. By relying on Lipschitz continuity, we transform the problem to a finite optimisation whose approximation has provable guarantees, and subsequently reduce the finite optimisation to the solution of a two-player turn-based game. We design algorithms to compute the upper and lower bounds, and demonstrate that the bounds converge to the maximum safe radius in the experiments.
Finally, we notice that the minimum value of P(v ) − P(v) L k is equivalent to the optical value required by Equation (3).
A.3 Details of the video dataset and the network
As a popular benchmark for human action recognition in videos, UCF101 [25] consists of 101 annotated action classes, e.g., JugglingBalls (human-object interaction), HandstandPushups (bodymotion only), HairCut (human-human interaction), PlayingPiano (playing musical instruments), and FloorGymnastics (sports). It labels 13 320 video clips of 27 hours in total, and each frame has dimension 320 × 240 × 3.
In the experiments, we exploit a VGG16 + LSTM architecture, in the sense of utilising the VGG16 network to extract the spatial features from the UCF101 video dataset and then passing these features to a separate RNN unit LSTM. For each video, we sample a frame every 1000 ms and stitch them together into a sequence of frames. Specifically, we run every frame from every video through VGG16 with input size 224 × 224 × 3, excluding the top classification part of the network, i.e., saving the output from the final Max-Pooling layer. Hence, for each video, we retrieve a sequence of extracted spatial features. Subsequently, we pass the features into a single LSTM layer, followed by a Dense layer with some Dropout in between. Eventually, after the final Dense layer with activation function Softmax, we get the classification outcome.
We use the categorical cross-entropy loss function and the accuracy metrics for both the VGG16 and LSTM models. Whilst the former has a SGD optimiser and directly exploits the imagenet weights, we train the latter through a rmsprop optimiser and get 99.15% training accuracy as well as 99.72% testing accuracy. Specifically, when the loss difference cannot reflect the subtle perturbation on optical flow during the computation of upper bounds, we use the discrepancy of logit values instead. (Figures 4 and 5 , Section 6), we attach another example to illustrate the convergence of the upper and lower bounds. Similarly, Figure 10 exhibits four sampled frames (top row) from a HammerThrow video and the optical flows extracted between them (2nd row). The descending upper bounds (red) and the ascending lower bounds (blue) to approximate the value of MSR are presented in Figure 9 . Intuitively, after 20 iterations of the gradient-based algorithm, the upper bound, i.e., minimum distance to an adversarial example, is 5670.31 based on the L 2 distance metric. That is, any manipulation imposed on the flows exceeding this upper bound is definitely unsafe. Figure 10 (3rd row) shows some of such unsafe perturbations on each optical flow, which result in the misclassification of the video into FrontCrawl with confidence 99.86%. As for the lower bound, we observe that, after 1000 iterations of the admissible A* algorithm, the lower bound reaches 52.95. That is, manipulations within this L 2 -norm ball is absolutely safe. Some of such safe perturbations can be found in the bottom row of Figure 10 . 
